Anita Jovičić

Research Forum, European Movement in Serbia

“Major change does not come without major effort. Major change does not come without new rules, creativity, and determination. Profound change does not occur on its own, through gradual evolution or the mere transformation of one system into another. It happens through discontinuity, by breaking chains and establishing new relations.”

Dr Zoran Đinđić

 

After October 5, Serbia found itself “in the shock of its new ‘birth’, moving from a closed society governed by hierarchies of dominance and subordination, and by the quasi-magical forces of historicism as a platform of servitude, toward an open society grounded in rationalism and critical capacities.[1]” The government of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić laid the foundations for the development of a liberal-democratic society based on democratic values, individual freedoms, and a break with the terror of totalitarian collectivism and nationalism. During this period, optimism, creative energy, and reformist momentum began to shape the citizens of Serbia as free citizens.

 

The uncertainty inherent to the transitional period, combined with the repercussions of the politics of the 1990s, produced a fragile social atmosphere. Alongside political instability, driven both by organic and by induced disagreements within the ruling party’s conglomerate, fertile ground was created for populist opportunists to thrive. Fueled by the media, the struggle among the leaders of this coalition further intensified social turmoil. By the time the term post-truth gained global prominence, it was already a familiar concept to the citizens of Serbia.

 

Exploiting the atmosphere among citizens—shaped by economic instability, rapid and tectonic socio-political changes, and unpopular political decisions implemented under pressure from the international community—President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Vojislav Koštunica opposed the government’s policies and advocated for continuity with the previous administration.

 

This political approach gained the upper hand after March 12, 2003, when Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić of Serbia was assassinated. Symbolically, it signaled that there was no place for a European-oriented future. The premiership was soon assumed by Vojislav Koštunica, representing continuity with the collectivist-nationalist politics of the 1990s. His policy was based on a “rollback of reforms, including privatization, the Europeanization of education, confronting the past, fostering tolerance in public discourse, and promoting freedom of thought and critical inquiry”[2]—in short, a rejection of the entire policy agenda of Đinđić’s government.

 

The first media laws in Serbia after the 2000 political changes were passed slowly and reluctantly, driven primarily by initiatives from the non-governmental sector. It can be said that there was neither political will nor a clear strategy aimed at finding solutions to promote the democratization of the inherited, cumbersome post-communist system. Key concepts of democratic media, such as: independence, pluralism, and the public interest, as well as: journalistic norms like objectivity, investigative reporting, and factual accuracy, were only accepted in principle, but were scarcely or never implemented in practice.

 

“If Zoran Đinđić survives, Serbia will not…” was the title of an article by journalist Aleksandar Tijanić, then an advisor to President Koštunica. It was published one month before Prime Minister Đinđić’s assassination.

 

Aleksandar Tijanić served as media advisor to President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Vojislav Koštunica. His previous role as a minister under Milošević and his friendship with Mira Marković, as well as his lack of formal qualifications for the position, did not appear to be an obstacle. From this position, Tijanić primarily focused his activities on discrediting the first democratically elected government, including criminalizing Prime Minister Đinđić’s character and associating him and his close collaborators with organized crime networks.

 

By a decision of the Government of Serbia on March 18, 2004, Aleksandar Tijanić was appointed as Director General of RTS. This act violated, among other things, the Law on Broadcasting, which stipulates that the Director General of RTS is to be appointed and dismissed by the Management Board, which in turn is appointed and dismissed by the Council of the Broadcasting Agency.[3]

 

The question of the moral legitimacy of appointing such a figure to the position of Director General of the public broadcaster also arises. In his writings, he did not hesitate to make chauvinistic and sexist remarks, discrediting women. In this context, “various organizations addressed Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, requesting Tijanić’s dismissal. In response to offensive and discriminatory statements made against YUCOM President Biljana Kovačević-Vučo, forty non-governmental organizations demanded that the Prime Minister… dismiss RTS Director General Aleksandar Tijanić. This request went unanswered. Following the disqualifying remarks Tijanić made about Biljana Kovačević-Vučo, the British newspaper Independent published an article on the ‘RTS Director – Sexist.’”[4]

 

Since 2015, the Association of Serbian Journalists has awarded the “Aleksandar Tijanić” Prize for Courage in Journalism. The most recent recipient is journalist Zoran Kesić, employed by the opposition television channel Nova S, who officially adheres to the highest journalistic ethical standards. He accepted the award.  

 

In Serbia, a system gradually emerged, in line with the policy of “continuity,” that resembles the most sophisticated forms of authoritarian rule, prompting theorists to reconsider conceptual frameworks. Unlike classical authoritarian systems, which based their power on overt violence and ideological indoctrination, informational autocracies “convince citizens of their competence and goodwill through censored or co-opted media; their legitimacy rests more on popularity than on fear.[5]” In this case, propaganda mechanisms are not used to “reprogram the way people think according to some overarching ideology,[6]” but solely to create the appearance of effective leadership and thereby reinforce the ruler’s legitimacy.[7]

 

Formally, the legislative framework governing the media is among the most advanced in the region. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, and the laws on public information, electronic media, and the protection of journalists nominally safeguard the basic rights of journalists and other media professionals. Yet, reality tells a different story. According to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders report, Serbia ranks 98th out of 180 countries on the Press Freedom Index, representing a drop of seven places compared to the previous year. Journalists are exposed to threats fueled by political attacks from government representatives and other political actors. Crimes committed against journalists are almost entirely unpunished, while pressures continue to increase.  

 

When it comes to the safety of journalists, a fundamental prerequisite for their ability to work freely, the judicial system is often ineffective. A stark example of this is last year’s acquittal, which could also be described as a “warning”, of those accused of murdering journalist Slavko Ćuruvija in 1999. Another result of such an attitude toward journalists is the case of journalist Brankica Stanković. After the first episode of her investigative series Insajder: (In)Power of the State, which focused on the leaders of football fan groups, she has been subjected to serious threats to this day. She regularly receives messages claiming that she is “poisonous as a snake and will end up like Ćuruvija,” particularly from sports stadiums. Since 2009, Serbian state institutions have declared themselves powerless to stop this and have retreated in the face of hooligans. Regardless of changes in government, the continuity of attacks on journalists and threats to their safety has not been broken to this day. Attacks on journalists occur almost daily, and journalist murders remain unresolved, such as the case of journalist Dada Vujasinović.

 

With the ongoing student protests, the situation in the media has worsened and become more exposed. The minimization of the significance of the demonstrations, the ignoring of critical and opposition voices, and the manipulative tone of reporting by RTS, Serbia’s public broadcaster, have become evident. Students have rightly identified this as one of the key problems. According to numerous studies, public broadcasters that offer high-quality content have a significant impact on citizens’ level of information, the quality of public debate, the development of democracy, and overall social trust in the media. Through its work, RTS has laid the groundwork for the emergence of numerous negative phenomena in the media and provided an alibi for other media outlets to violate moral and professional codes.

 

On one side of Serbia’s current media landscape are pro-government outlets, for which violations of the Serbian Journalists’ Code, as well as breaches of moral, ethical, and even legal norms, are a daily occurrence. On the other side, “opposition” media under the patronage of the United Media group have further intensified narratives and deepened polarization since the beginning of the protests. The fact is that, without media outlets like N1, citizens would be deprived of numerous important pieces of information. However, it is also true that this outlet does not hesitate to give a platform to numerous figures who are often among the main actors responsible for maintaining continuity with the 1990s and portraying October 5 as an anomaly. The only requirement seems to be that they voice opposition to the current government; whatever else they say is thereby justified.

 

What is evident is the development of political parallelism[8], which can almost be studied using Serbia as a case study. In such countries, “media are often partisan and serve as an extension of political actors.”[9] Combined with public distrust in the media and low levels of media literacy, this creates an ideal environment for the dissemination of misinformation.

 

Although Serbia is a candidate country for European Union membership, popular support for the EU remains very low, largely due to media reporting, while anti-Western and anti-democratic narratives are becoming increasingly popular. This has been further reinforced by foreign propaganda influence, which has spread more intensively in Serbia, particularly since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, both through tabloid agendas and campaigns targeting journalists and media workers. Russian state media have continued to operate freely in Serbia, despite EU recommendations that sanctions against Russia be applied to the media and information space in the country.

 

Continuous political pressures testify to deeply rooted problems with media freedom in Serbia, which cannot be overcome merely through formal alignment with EU legislation. Genuine progress would require clear political will, strengthening of institutional accountability, and abandoning the practice of using disinformation as a tool to maintain power. The professionalization of the media, understood as “the extent to which journalists and media organizations are guided by professional norms, ethics, and autonomy in relation to political and economic pressures,”[10] should be the first step in this process. Otherwise, European recommendations remain unimplemented, and the struggle for free media is reduced to declarative rhetoric without substance. For Serbia, the fight for free media represents a key test of democratic maturity and readiness for genuine transformation.

 

 

 

References:

• Hallin, Daniel C., & Mancini, Paolo. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
• Human Rights Lawyers’ Committee – JUKOM. The Case of Official Aleksandar Tijanić. Belgrade: YUCOM, 2005.
• Jovanović, Miodrag. “Serbia as an Informational Autocracy: The Role of REM.” Peščanik, August 12, 2022. https://pescanik.net/srbija-kao-informaciona-autokratija-uloga-rem-a/
• Samardžić, Nikola. “Vojislav Koštunica: A Career.” Peščanik, May 19, 2006. https://pescanik.net/vojislav-kostunica-jedna-karijera/

 

[1] Nikola Samardžić, “Vojislav Koštunica: A Career,” Peščanik, May 19, 2006.
https://pescanik.net/vojislav-kostunica-jedna-karijera/

[2] Ibid.

[3] Human Rights Lawyers’ Committee – YUCOM, The Case of Official Aleksandar Tijanić (Belgrade: Grafonin, 2005), 134.

[4] Human Rights Lawyers’ Committee – YUCOM, The Case of Official Aleksandar Tijanić, 189.

[5] Guriev and Treisman 2020, as cited in Miodrag Jovanović, “Serbia as an Informational Autocracy: The Role of REM,” Peščanik, August 12, 2022.
https://pescanik.net/srbija-kao-informaciona-autokratija-uloga-rem-a/

[6] Ibid.

[7] Miodrag Jovanović, “Serbia as an Informational Autocracy: The Role of REM,” Peščanik, August 12, 2022.
https://pescanik.net/srbija-kao-informaciona-autokratija-uloga-rem-a/

[8] Political parallelism refers to the degree of connection between the media system and the political system, that is, the extent to which the media reflect political divisions in society and identify with specific political parties, ideologies, or interest groups. (Daniel C. Hallin & Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 28–30.)

[9] Hallin, Daniel C., & Mancini, Paolo. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, 28–30.

[10] Hallin, Daniel C., & Mancini, Paolo. Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, 34–36.   

 

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