Reviewed by Prof. Duško Lopandić
The weight of silence: Vučić and Zelensky speaking but saying little
Since president Trump set about negotiating a peace between Ukraine and Russia, there has been a proliferation of meetings and summits devoted to the goal. Trump’s approach seems to be primarily a transactional one, with the EU struggling to protect multilateralism and to fully participate in the peace process, partially from its fear that the new security order would be created without it, partially due to the fear that the international liberal order is being replaced by great power bargaining. Where is Serbia in all this? It has been largely silent in relation to the peace negotiations, trying to maintain good relations with all sides. While traditionally having warm relations with Russia, Serbia has opened itself up to the US after Trump’s victory last year. President Vučić explains this saying that Trump is the “most popular American leader in Serbia”, claiming that there was no other country in Europe in which citizens supported Trump to such an extent (1). It is surprising then that Vučić was not inspired by either him, or his political ally Orban’s attempts to mediate in the peace process, although perhaps he learned from Orban’s experience of being severely chastised by the EU.
Rather it might not be in the interest of the president to get involved in such a controversial topic such as peace in Ukraine, especially as it might hinder his policy of trying to be on good terms with all powers. Related to this is the recent trip of Vučić to China, where he went to sign economic deals and expand cooperation, while at the same time maintaining solid working relations with the EU. While he said that membership in the EU is Serbia’s goal, he also expressed openness to bilateral deals with the US and China (2), which is generally taken as evidence of a multi-vector balancing or hedging policy. This however goes against the stated goal of EU membership, as the EU expects Serbia to align with its common foreign and security policy and to actively participate in it, demanding that Serbia makes additional efforts to further align itself as a matter of priority. The main point of contention is Serbia’s continual refusal to apply restrictive measures against Russia, as well as what the EU describes as “instances of anti-Western narratives”, both “raising questions about Serbia’s strategic direction” in Brussels. Serbia continues to provide humanitarian and financial assistance to Ukraine, however it has taken measures to prevent even indirect ammunition exports to the country due to Russian pressure (3).
Serbia has taken a generally neutral and disengaged attitude from the early days of the conflict in Ukraine. Its representatives attended summits, support the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but do nothing functionally to further the cause of peace. At the The Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit in Athens in 2023, regional leaders agreed on a Declaration that gave support to Ukraine, including in its EU accession process. Vučić did not agree with part of the Declaration which called for the introduction of sanctions against Russia, managing to remove that element from the final text and justifying this as the defense of Serbian interests (4). Meeting Zelensky at the margins, the two agreed that mutual support for territorial integrity and sovereignty is an important part of the partnership between Ukraine and Serbia. Zelensky thanked Vučić for the humanitarian assistance provided by Serbia, and called on him to support the Ukrainian Peace Formula (5), keeping the relationship tepid and pragmatic.
At the next summit related to Ukraine, held in Tirana in 2024, Vučić proudly announced that the agreement reached did not mention sanctions against Russia or Russia’s negative influence, saying it was at his prevented at his urging. He explained that “despite the desire to uphold international law and support Ukrainian friends, Serbia cannot accept this”, framing it as a success of his activities (6). The declaration which he signed however, stated that Russia was an aggressor that was to blame for the conflict in Ukraine and that it was “the greatest threat to the European security and international peace”. It also stated that all signatories fully support Ukraine’s right to join NATO, and that they were determined to support the Ukrainian Peace Formula which included the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and the restoration of the pre-2014 borders (7). This was is a significant policy act that was almost completely ignored by Serbian media, and by Vučić himself.
Relations were stable enough for the Ukrainian foreign minister, Kuleba, to visit Serbia and meet both Vučić and his Prime Minister Vučević, discussing the improvement of bilateral relations and the EU accession path of the two countries. Vučić said that he had a good conversation with the foreign minister, yet stressed the main topic was economic cooperation, while only vaguely mentioning the need for peace (8). The prime minister then immediately met the Russian ambassador, stating that Serbia aimed to remain a militarily neutral state, thanking Russia for the support it gives to Serbia’s territorial integrity (9). The next month, Serbia’s foreign minister Djurić attended the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland, signing a declaration saying that Ukraine’s territorial integrity has to be the basis for the peace agreement (10). The limited warming continued as Vučić had a phone call at the end of the year with Zelensky, saying that Serbia reopened its embassy in Kiev and that the two countries might have more bilateral visits in the future (11), not specifying however what the content or substance of such visits might be.
In the next spring, they spoke again on the phone, with Vučić saying that the discussion was good and open, and that it again concerned bilateral relations and EU integration of both countries. The same day he met the EU’s high representative Kallas, saying that Serbia has the capacity to contribute to keeping peace and stability while protecting its national interests, remaining a reliable partner (12). However at the next Ukraine – Southeast Europe summit at Odessa, even though Vučić participated, he did not sign the declaration because it called on strengthening sanctions against Russia. He was the only one not to sign, and said that Serbia refused to betray Russia and chose to remain neutral. In a meeting with Zelensky on the sidelines he reaffirmed Serbia’s strong support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while having what he called a “significant and open discussion” (13). The next year, in may 2026 they had another phone call, repeating the same lines and declaring vaguely the importance of dialogue, mutual understanding and peace, with Zelensky calling for stronger development of relations between the countries (14). This was followed a visit of a Ukrainian delegation of the ministry for trade and Euro-atlantic integration, which proceeded in a business-like way and focused entirely on trade and the European integration of the states (15), receiving very limited media attention after it was held.
Serbia’s behavior at multilateral fora suggests alignment with EU policy related to the Ukraine conflict, yet this is not reflected in its wider diplomacy, where bilateral engagement with Ukraine remains limited, depoliticised, and largely devoid of significant political content. Serbia simultaneously maintains regular outreach towards Russia to allay its concerns and reaffirm its neutrality, so that in practice it is doing all it can not to antagonise Russia. It maintains a business-like relationship with Ukraine and supports general principles, limiting the practical support it pledged to provide Ukraine in front of the EU. Through its balancing act and neutrality signaling, Serbia ends up creating a certain incoherence across its diplomatic activities in order to maintain compatibility with mutually incompatible partners.
Serbia follows different diplomatic behaviours across contexts, managing contradiction through case-specific alignment or lack thereof in practice and discourse, in order to maintain positive relations with opposing sides within the same overall diplomatic process. This results in limited bilateral substance with Ukraine despite repeated symbolic contact and limited movement towards practical alignment with EU policy, giving only limited and careful commitment. Serbia is therefore doing enough to maintain credibility towards the EU while avoiding harming relations with Russia, leading to dissatisfaction in the EU vis-à-vis Serbia’s alignment. Serbia thereby remains structurally peripheral to conflict resolution in Ukraine and to the wider restructuring of the European security order, maintaining its multi-vector policy through this managed contradiction at the detriment of increased trust with the EU.
Sources:
1 https://n1info.rs/vesti/vucic-pozvao-trampa-u-beograd
2-https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-02/exclusive-serbian-president-vucic-says-china-is
-eclipsing-europe?srnd=homepage-americas
3 https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6e68ce26-b95b-48e1-921a-c60c12da8f00_
en?filename=serbia-report-2025.pdf
4 https://www.vreme.com/en/vesti/deklaracija-iz-atine-sta-tacno-pise-u-njoj/)
5 https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-zustrivsya-z-prezidentom-serbiyi-na-polyah-sa-85061
6 https://euronews.al/en/vucic-tirana-summit-declaration-does-not-mention-sanctions-against-russia
7 https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/deklaraciya-camitu-ukrayina-pivdenno-shidna-yevropa-89397
8 https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/politika/123464/vucic-i-vucevic-u-odvojenim-sastancima-sa
-ukrajinskim-sefom-diplomatije-kuleba-imamo-mnogo-toga-zajednickog/vest
9 https://www.mod.gov.rs/lat/20891/sastanak-ministra-vucevica-sa-ambasadorom-
Ruske-federacije-bocan-harcenkom20891
10 https://n1info.rs/english/news/serbia-backs-ukraine-peace-summit-declaration
11 https://www.euronews.rs/srbija/politika/151120/vucic-dobar-i-sadrzajan-razgovor-
sa-zelenskim-o-vaznim-pitanjima-saradnje/vest
12 https://n1info.rs/vesti/vucic-dobar-i-otvoren-razgovor-sa-zelenskim/
13 https://www.nin.rs/english/news/80246/serbia-did-not-sign-the-declaration-
In-ukraine-due-to-calls-for-sanctions-against-moscow
14 https://www.rts.rs/lat/vesti/politika/5954626/vucic-zelenski-razgovor-telefon.html
15 https://must.gov.rs/vest/sr/19708/sastanak-ukrajinske-delegacije-sa-predsednikom-srbije-i-
Ministarkom-lazarevic.php
